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Abstract. In this paper the author will try to demonstrate that the basic assumption for 
understanding the actual events in the world is the conceptualization of the logic of 
production and the re-production of the world itself. Contrary to a series of 
ideologically produced and media- and publicity-mediated false alternatives and 
mystifications, it is necessary to embrace the wholeness of the world, in order to be 
able to distinguish mystifications from factually established real tendencies of our 
epoch. We examined whether the onto-logic, elaborated in the very beginnings of 
modern times by “the notorious metaphysicist and declared foe of common sense” 
Hegel, can offer methodical and content-adding contributions for the purpose of grasping 
world-historical processes as a whole. Further, we discussed the question whether the 
reconstruction of the logic of reproduction of the modern world, as reconstructed by 
Hegel’s follower and critic Marx, can actually be used for such a grasp of the wholeness 
of the world. Besides, there is the question of how much the contradictions of this 
globalized world depend upon ideologizations of Marx’s concepts and upon the downfall 
of the alleged realization of the ideologically disguised Marx’s teachings – and how much 
is the result of nihilistic trends of the era we find ourselves in. 
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To what extent can Hegel and Marx help us understand today’s world? That is, to 
grasp comprehensively and conceptually what is generally diagnosed as the global crisis? 
Such questions will provoke profound denial in many quarters and, in some, even derision. 
Some will ask rhetorically whether Hegel was not an incurable metaphysicist whose 
scientific credibility is absolutely compromised by his insane and illogical claims, such as 
the assertion that pure being and pure nothing are one and the same thing (cfr. for example: 
Russell 1950, especially ch. 1 and ch. 4; Carnap 1971; Popper 2002; Berlin 2003). Moreover, 
in well-meant evaluations, Hegel is appraised as being a naïve optimist, outmoded and quaint, 
a man without intelligence and critical thinking (Popper 1994, 70). Is there anything at all 
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2 L. VELJAK 
that Hegel can tell us today? Not to mention Marx. Was Marx not the ideologist of a 
malignant totalitarianism whose implementation cost the lives of millions? It could be 
said that, in academic philosophy, academic social sciences and mainstream mass media, 
there prevails an almost absolute consensus of opinion of Hegel as a hopelessly obsolete 
and completely irrelevant metaphysicist (no longer worth mentioning except in specialized 
histories of dead ideas), and the opinion of Marx as an author who actualized the most 
malevolent potential of Hegel’s metaphysics, shaping a totalitarian (in fact also criminal) 
ideology, which should either be ignored or exhibited as a cautionary example of how far 
the abandonment of ground secured by common sense and a commitment to the generally 
accepted values of a civil society could lead (cfr. two very mild versions of this type of 
criticism: Popper 1973 and Kolakowski 1978). 
It seems that any further possibility for discussion ends here. However, before we 
abandon the idea of any possible contextualization of these two thinkers in a contemporary 
framework, it would be advisable to reconsider the validity of such simplified assessments. 
I shall attempt to show that, contrary to the usual evaluations, Hegel and Marx’s 
opinions provide us with profound comprehension and conceptualization of our era and 
the prospects of the future. The starting point of the argument lies in the insight that 
Hegel’s logic is also an ontology (cfr. for example Marcuse 1960. and Hegel 1970, 81, 
but also some new different interpretations: White 1983; Hartmann 1999; Houlgate 2005; 
Kervégan 2008.). What comes to be does not come to be through accident or chaos 
(although it not infrequently has the semblance of chaos); it is not a given, but is based on 
the logos of the production and reproduction of being, including – and this is of particular 
importance in this context – the being of the historical human world (subjective, objective 
and absolute spirit). The self-development of the wholeness of everything that is guided 
by a logos which is immanent in the being and in the shaping of the spirit (cfr. Hegel 
1970, 13).
1
 The logic which guides the historical development of humankind pertains to 
this wholeness, while individual manifestations of the whole are differentiated from one 
another in accordance with a unique onto-logic. 
The development of this wholeness has, understandably, its own empirical manifestations. 
The world is not a representation of solipsistic reason but develops in reality and its forms 
are accessible to our senses. However, common sense cannot adequately grasp this world 
because of its limitation to empirical manifestations, and it inevitably happens that it is 
often impossible to differentiate the true from the false. It is not sufficient for something 
to become objective in order for it to be true. Thus the appearance of a particular purpose 
also implies its objectivity – however, if the purpose is unreasonable, it cannot be true. 
This applies especially if the particularity is proclaimed a universality by absolutization 
and designation as an absolute truth. Common sense is incapable of grasping such an 
absolutizing elevation of the particular to the level of the universal. Specifically, in a civil 
world, the right of particularity of a free individual is absolutized, but the principle of 
particularity may have its true sense only if this particularity is reasonable (that is, if its 
properties are such that the contradiction between the particular and the universal, the 
subjective and the objective, is negated). It is not enough for a particularity to impose 
itself as existing objectively in order to be proclaimed a final truth. Only when such 
                                                          
1 In this context could be very significative the following thought: „Das Wahre ist das Ganze. Das Ganze aber 
ist nur das durch seine Entwicklung sich vollendende Wesen. Es ist von dem Absoluten zu sagen, dass es 
wesentlich Resultat, dass es erst am Ende das ist, was es in Wahrheit ist; und hierin eben besteht seine Natur, 
Wirkliches, Subjekt oder Sichselbstwerden zu sein“ (Ibid, 24). 
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particularity is reconciled with other particularities can it gain its own truthfulness. This 
is the essence of Hegel’s search for the identity of the finite and the infinite by which he 
annuls the proclamation of the finite as eternal law and supplements belief in the eternal 
validity of that finality with a belief in the infinity of the transcendent, which is merely a 
projected finality (Cfr. Hegel 1970, 102). Thus the antithesis of abstract subjectivity and 
empty longing, the antithesis of metaphysics and empiricism, is overcome. This cannot be 
achieved by absolutized common sense, but by the appropriate method of comprehension of 
the reflexive strategy of mediation of consciousness as self-mediation of self-consciousness. 
Hegel’s overcoming of finality, according to the interpretation of (in my opinion) one 
of the best interpreters of classic German idealism Milan Kangrga, concerns exclusively 
the human being and the human world produced through history (Cfr. Kangrga 2004, 
305–323). Milan Kangrga2 was not merely an interpreter but also an original thinker who, 
at the end of the second and the beginning of the third millennium, developed the 
contemplative potential of classical speculative philosophy and formed an opinion of the 
future appropriate to our era, purely with respect to the human being and his products, all 
that mankind has produced, i.e. the human subconscious world. Admittedly, Kangrga here 
discusses man inadequately. That final human being is indeed a being whose determination 
must cease to be what it is and transform itself into the infinite (in Hegel’s terminology into 
the spirit, but one which is not spiritual in character). According to Kangrga, this means a 
human being must produce himself through his own action into what, as a thinking being, 
he can become, and this is not something which is given in advance by nature or birth, but 
what the human being must struggle to achieve (Cfr. Kangrga 1983, 371–372). 
The world is a human product, but its production is not arbitrary: rather, it takes place 
in accordance with the logic of reproduction, which is immanent in the character of the 
historically produced world. 
Marx incorporated this logic of Hegel’s into his own method. This will result in insight 
into the main features of the modern world. This insight is that the modern world (the civil, 
bourgeoisie capitalist world) is governed by the logic of capital, to be more precise, the 
logic of the production and the reproduction of profit. In the process of labor, human 
activity results in a change in the object of labor in accordance with the set purpose of that 
labor, and thus creates usability, as Marx stated explicitly in the first volume of his Das 
Kapital. The product is objectivated. The result of the labor is a product which has acquired 
its being: the worker spins and his product is yarn. Through living work, usable objects are 
produced and these become objects of exchange, commodities in the market. Upon becoming 
commodities, these products acquire an independent being, although this does not merely 
mean that they are alienated from the producer, and thence result in the reification of the 
human being, but also, what is most important in this context, the products are subjected to 
the logic of the production of exchange value, the essence of which is profit. The logic of 
the production of a product is thus replaced by the logic of the acquisition of surplus value, 
                                                          
2 Milan Kangrga (1923–2008) is an important Croatian (and Yugoslav) philosopher, unortunatelly – like Marek 
Siemek – not enough known and valorised thinker – one of the leading thinkers in the so-called Praxis school of 
thought and author of many for our problems very relevant books; there are yet available only on Croatian, with 
the exception of his book Praxis-Zeit-Welt, Würzburg (Königshausen & Neumann) 2004, which was translated 
into German and the book Ethics and Liberty, translated into Slowakian, but published in Bratislava in the first 
days after the Sowiet occupation and practically unavaliable. He especially – on the basis of the speculative 
rethinking of relationship between Hegel and Marx – emphasized the understanding of human beings as 
producers humanizing nature. 
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although it is not a question of greed on the part of the wicked or corrupt capitalist (as it 
would be according to the proponents of moral criticism of capitalism who believe that 
current problems, e.g. the problems caused on a global scale by the recent financial crisis, 
would be resolved if the market protagonists were devoid of greed), but of need: those who 
would renounce the maximization of profit in the given circumstances would necessarily be 
condemned to bankrupt and ruin. 
In the words of Marx, this is the supremacy of dead labor (produced products of past 
labor which have become commodities, and which – like the protagonists and other 
participants in their sale – are subject to the inevitable logic of market behavior) over live 
labor (which is subject to the logic of technical execution, for its own part again actually 
limited by market logic) (Cfr. Marx 1964, especially ch. 9). Some points of Marx’s analysis 
of live labor may be problematic (it should be borne in mind that he lived in the nineteenth 
century when the automation and informatization of production were entirely inconceivable). 
What is not problematic, however, is the following: Ontologically speaking, production 
precedes exchange; usability acquires its being before the usable product becomes a 
commodity. However, the sense of production of any product intended for the market 
cannot be derived from the original ontological priority, but from its intended use, from the 
reason a certain product is produced at all. In this way, the sense of a particular product is 
derived from the logic of acquisition and maximization of profit, that is, the logic of capital. 
Capital is thereby expressed not only as a real subject, but also as a being of the civil world 
in the classical metaphysical sense of that term. Indeed, to use the once fashionable 
jargon of Martin Heidegger, capital is proliferated as a sense of being. This sense is 
manifest in the self-purpose of extended reproduction of profit. The fact that this sense is 
self-purpose indicates the character of the established world and particularly the logic of 
its reproduction. The ontological foundation of the contemporary civil world can at the 
same time also represent a starting point for an adequate understanding and comprehension 
of current trends, financial and economic crises, as well as the political and social tensions 
and conflicts which characterize our times. In other words, this foundation facilitates the 
release of superficiality and unilateral analyses and diagnoses; it is of particular importance 
to mention that this foundation provides a methodical basis for insight into the ideological 
(deceptive even) character of a significant (and perhaps the largest) part of the analyses 
and diagnoses we encounter in circulation today in academic circles and the mass media. 
What this means is that even the best-intentioned analysis, if not founded on insight 
into the logic of wholeness which governs the reproduction of the human world, is 
doomed to being partial, in the sense of being one-sided and thus untrue: remaining on 
the surface of a phenomenon or process inevitably means falling into falsehood. Only if 
partial analyses (and that means all analyses which pertain to the individual and particular 
aspects and dimensions of the research process, which are otherwise essential for every 
serious diagnosis of the problems and difficulties characteristic of that process) are integrated 
into a wholeness, may it reasonably be expected that that they will contribute to a real 
understanding and comprehension of the process in question. However, despite well-
intentioned approaches that pay the price of servitude to common sense and empiricism, 
there are still approaches to the analysis and diagnosis of the reproduction of our world 
(and thus production and commodity exchange) in use (and not from yesterday but 
practically from the very beginning of industrialization and the initial accumulation of 
capital, although often in very different forms), which employ the reasoning of the 
common sense and empirical methods to justify establishing the manner of reproduction 
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as the only possible, or at least the best possible way of life. From the famous metaphor 
the invisible hand coined by Adam Smith (Cfr. for example von Suntum 2000. and Basu 
2010) to the elaboration by Friedrich von Hayek and the representatives of the libertarian 
school of economics, whose most famous member was Milton Friedman, there have been 
attempts to justify this logic of reproduction as optimal or even as the only one possible. 
In understanding the untruth of Hayek and Friedman’s elaborations (which must undoubtedly 
be recognized as having moved beyond mere theory to profoundly alter the modern world, 
from the socio-economic experiments successfully undertaken in certain Latin American 
countries, e.g. Chile after Pinochet’s military coup in 1973, to the globalization of libertarian 
principles of economic and social regulation, which began at the time when Ronald Reagan 
and Margaret Thatcher were in power, to become, at the beginning of this millennium, a 
process which is taken for granted on a global level) (cfr. Caldwell 2011, especially the 
chapter “Eleven – The Chicago School, Hayek, and Neoliberalism”, 301–334; concerning 
Chile cfr. Valdes 2008. and Grassi 2003), we are helped by Hegel: the elevation of partial 
interests to the level of the general good may be carried out successfully, but its success 
alone does not necessarily make it true. It acquires its truthfulness only if it corresponds 
with to the interests of the wholeness. This correspondence existed at the time of global 
industrialization (although industrialization had its dark aspects, from the proletarization 
of a significant part of the population to the dark sides of colonization) and, on the whole, 
led to the advancement of humanity and the abolition of pre-civil forms of inequality and 
slavery, about which Marx speaks impressively (and in the Manifesto at that). Finally, at 
the time the welfare state was established in developed countries, it led to improvements 
for the population of those countries. Also, however, at the time of truthfulness (not just 
the empirically self-evident), the elevation of partial interests to the level of the general 
good (whose elevation is a constant of the civil society founded on the market), Hegel’s 
diagnosis applied to the proclamation of that correspondence when something is finally 
(and any social creation is by definition something final) proclaimed as eternal law – it 
represents a fall into the unavoidable crevice between empiricism and metaphysics. The 
absolutization of a limited form excludes any possibility of insight into its internal 
contradiction. Let us take the example of someone who is a student today. His partial 
characteristic, that he studies, (because in addition to studying he also eats, drinks, 
perhaps sometimes has some fun and even makes love) proclaims the essence of his 
being and this identification contains truth. If this truth, however, is proclaimed eternal, it 
directly implies that he will never graduate but will remain a student forever. For a 
student to be successful (other than merely being empirically confirmed by the fact that 
he is a student), he must some day graduate and thereby cease being a student. 
If the correspondence of the partial and the general had a progressive and emancipating 
character during the period when pre-civil forms of social organization and reproduction 
were being eradicated, this has certainly been annulled in these days of libertarian 
globalization, and this abolishing (or abolition) is empirically manifested in phenomena 
such as what is known as financial crisis. The logic of reproduction of the society is 
identical and unavoidable; therefore, moral appeals against the greed symbolized by Wall 
Street are of no assistance. Nevertheless, in its preservation, the correspondence between 
the partial and the general has been lost. Unless this is understood, resignation is 
unavoidable. However, the cure for resignation and the surrender to nihilism must not be 
sought in nostalgic recollection of the times of actual socialism, because that system, 
based as it was on the ideologization and distortion of Marx’s concept, did not succeed in 
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establishing a human image of socialism and contributed directly to the establishment of 
the libertarian variant of globalization which exists today. However, an analysis of the 
role of Soviet Marxism and “scientific communism” in creating the premises for the 
current unenviable state of mankind would require far more time than we have at our 
disposal here. 
In conclusion: the basic assumption for understanding actual events in the world is the 
conceptualization of the logic of the production and reproduction of the world itself. 
Contrary to a series of false alternatives and mystifications produced ideologically and 
mediated by media and publicity, it is necessary to embrace the wholeness of the world in 
order to be able to differentiate between mystification and the factually established, real 
trends of our era. We have examined whether the onto-logic elaborated at the very beginning 
of modern times by Hegel, that notorious metaphysicist and declared enemy of common 
sense, is able to offer methodical and content-adding contributions for the intent of grasping 
world-historical processes as a whole. We have further discussed the question of whether the 
reconstruction of the logic reproduction of the modern world, as reconstructed by Marx, 
Hegel’s successor and critic, is actually serviceable for such a grasp of the wholeness of the 
world. There is, in addition, the question of the extent to which the contradictions of this 
globalized world depend on the ideologizations of Marx’s concepts and the downfall of the 
purported implementation of the ideologically disguised teaching of Marx – and how much 
of it is the result of the nihilistic trends of the era in which we find ourselves. 
Be that as it may, it is possible to make an adequate analysis and diagnosis of today’s 
world on the basis of Hegel and Marx’s method, and to open a space for the pursuit of the 
other and the different, the pursuit of the kind of future which will resolve current 
contradictions, not by descending into barbarism (and such a descent appears rather 
certain), but by transforming the logic of profit into the kind of logic of production which 
will correspond to the common interests of the human race. 
That is the real sense of the idea of revolution. 
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HEGEL I MARX U VREMENIMA GLOBALIZACIJE  
U ovom radu autor pokušava dokazati kako se osnovna pretpostavka za razumijevanje aktualnih 
svjetskih zbivanja sastoji u poimanju logike produkcije i reprodukcije svijeta. Nasuprot nizu 
ideologijski proizvedenim i medijski posredovanim lažnim alternativama i mistifikacijama, nužno je 
zahvatiti cjelinu svijeta, kako bismo mistifikacije mogli razdvojiti od faktički uspostavljenih tendencija 
naše epohe. Razmatra se i zbog čega onto-logika koju je elaborirao u zbiljskim počecima modernog 
doba “notorni metafizičar i deklarirani protivnik zdravog razuma” Hegel može ponuditi metodske i 
sadržajne doprinose za razumijevanje cjeline svjetsko-povijesnih procesa. Nadalje se razmatra pitanje 
zbog čega rekonstrukcija logike reprodukcije modernog svijeta kakvu je elaborirao Hegelov 
sljedbenik i kritičar Marx aktualno upotrebljiva za zahvaćanje cjeline svijeta. Konačno, tu je i pitanje 
u kojoj mjeri kontradikcije globaliziranog svijeta ovise o ideologizaciji Marxovih koncepata i o 
propasti tobožnje realizacije ideologijski izopačenih Marxovih učenja – a u kojoj su mjeri one učinak 
nihilističkih tendencija u eri u kojoj smo se zatekli. 
Ključne reči:  logika proizvodnje, Hegel, Marx, ideologija, metodologija, globalizacija. 
 
